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Abstract
This paper analyses how neighbors’ income affect agents’ well-being using
unprecedented data from the BRFSS and the City of Somerville. We conduct
a multi-scale approach at the county, ZIP code and street-levels and find that
the association between well-being and neighbors’ income follows an inverted
U-shaped pattern in the size of the area. We find a negative relationship
between well-being and neighbors’ income in the county of residence, but
the opposite at the ZIP code-level. Our results are consistent with the fact
that agents enjoy living in a rich ZIP code but also having poor faraway
neighbors since they have preferences for high social status. We test explicitly
this interpretation by including amenities and the relative rank in the local
income distribution in our model. At the street-level, we find a negative
association between neighbors’ income and self-reported well-being indicating
the presence of income comparisons between very close neighbors.
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Average Joes always envy rich people. This reflects the broad idea that we com-
pare to people with whom we interact. This group of agents may include people
having the same sex, age or education-level. But, the simplest idea is that we com-
pare to individuals with whom we live, our neighbors. Our question of interest is
how do neighbors’ income affect well-being? This relationship has important impli-
cations. If individuals derive utility from neighbors’ earnings, then shocks to one’s
neighbors’ may affect one’s consumption. The economic analysis of such relative
income effects can be traced back to at least Veblen (1899) and Duesenberry (1949).
In terms of policy, tax hikes may change these externalities by lowering or increas-
ing the relative income gap (Boskin and Sheshinski (1978)). Public spending and
housing policies also play a critical role in changing local area characteristics and
modifying income spillovers.
However, whether neighbors’ income has a negative or a positive impact on peo-
ple’s well-being is not straightforward. Several channels may be identified. A first
channel is income comparisons. When agents in our place of residence earn more,
we feel worse off because it lowers our relative income. This may also capture an ele-
ment of social status. Agents may enjoy having poorer faraway neighbors since they
have preferences for high social status. A second channel is amenities. Neighbors’
income is correlated with local area characteristics. Richer areas have on average
less criminality, better schools and a good economic environment. Therefore, agents
may enjoy living with rich people because they pay more taxes and provide better
amenities. Other channels may include a tunnel effect. Neighbors’ income con-
tain information about our own future prospects. Overall, the net effect of relative
income may be negative or positive depending on the relative size of these channels.
The literature exhibits no consensus about the effect of neighbors’ income on well-
being. Blanchflower and Oswald (2004), Helliwell and Huang (2011) and Luttmer
(2005) report that subjective well-being is positively associated with own income
and negatively correlated with average/median income in the region of residence.
They argue that the negative effect of neighbors’ earnings on well-being is due to
relative consumption. Luttmer (2005) used the 1987-88 and 1992-94 waves of the
National Survey of Families and Households and matched this data to the Public
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Use Microdata Areas (“PUMAs”). These areas have about 150,000 inhabitants on
average. Blanchflower and Oswald (2004) replicated a similar analysis using the
General Social Survey and state income per capita while Helliwell and Huang (2011)
relied on county-level data. They limit their analysis on income comparisons by
confirming the findings of Luttmer (2005).
Other studies rely on more disaggregated data and find opposite results. Clark
et al. (2009) and Dittmann and Goebel (2010)1 use respectively Danish and German
data. In their papers, they report that agents are more satisfied when their neigh-
bors are richer which contradicts the studies cited above and is consistent with a
public good interpretation. While it is possible that Americans and Europeans are
differently affected by income comparisons, our intuition is that the disparities in
those results are driven by the size of the local area.
Last, Kingdon and Knight (2007) use 366 randomly selected clusters covering
2,900 people on average and broader districts in South Africa. Their findings indicate
a positive relationship for clusters and a negative association between neighbors’
income and household satisfaction at the district-level. They note that most of the
clusters are racially homogeneous and that their results suggest evidence of empathy
for close neighbors and comparisons for those further away. In an unpublished paper,
Barrington-Leigh and Helliwell (2008) rely on different Canadian surveys and show
the relationship between measures of well-being and income spillovers for different
geographic scales. Their findings suggest that the overall spillover effect is negative.
Average and median income within a very large area may capture other effects
than income comparisons such as unemployment rate, criminality and public spend-
ings. The lack of large data sets and finely disaggregated data make the identification
of the different channels difficult. Our paper extends the investigation of this litera-
ture on income comparisons and well-being in several ways. We conduct a multi-scale
approach at the county and ZIP code-levels, using a very large data set, the Behav-
ioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS), and administrative data. We also
1Dittmann and Goebel (2010) measure the income of neighbors using an index covering infor-
mation such as the level of occupation, purchasing power and the rate of self-employment. See also
Knies et al. (2008) for a similar analysis using German ZIP codes covering 9,000 inhabitants on
average. Last, Clark et al. (2009) rely on geographical grid of 10 000 square meters.
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explicitly test the different mechanisms behind the association between neighbors’
income and well-being.
Our main findings indicate that faraway and close neighbors’ income affect dif-
ferently agents’ well-being. We include both the median income in the county and
the ZIP code of residence in our model and find that individuals report higher levels
of well-being when their close neighbors (ZIP code) are rich and the opposite for the
county of residence. This confirms the idea that there is a stronger identification to
close neighbors. We tend to care more about individuals close to us and less about
those in a faraway city. Moreover, city neighbors share the same public goods and
are potential coworkers. While there still might be a negative effect of comparisons,
it seems that it is overwhelmed by a public goods effect when the analysis is at
the ZIP code-level. Interestingly, both poorer and richer respondents are affected
similarly by the positive effect of income spillovers from close neighbors, but this is
not the case at the county-level. The negative association is statistically stronger
for residents poorer than the ZIP code median income which could mean that both
types of agents benefit from amenities but that social status matters more for poorer
residents.2
Our intuition of the findings is confirmed by controlling for a large set of ameni-
ties in the local area. Adding amenities in our model increases economically and
statistically significantly the negative impact of neighbors’ income on respondents’
satisfaction. This confirms our results that agents enjoy income spillovers because
of the public goods. Interestingly, local area characteristics such as criminality and
economic activity seem to affect more the variable county median income than di-
rect expenditures by the local government. This might be an indication that agents
prefer to live with rich neighbors mainly because it provides a safer environment
and better economic conditions. We also present specifications where we add the
relative position in the local income distribution. Conditional on own income and
relative income rank in the county, the relationship between life satisfaction and
median county income is now positive and significant.
2We find that individuals are sensitive to poverty since they prefer living in counties where they
are among the richest people, but also where poverty is less prevalent.
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In the last section, we rely on an unprecedented survey conducted by the City of
Somerville, Massachusetts. This survey contains information on self-reported well-
being, income and address of residence. We find evidence that residents of Somerville
compare to people living in their street. At this very finely disaggregated level,
income comparisons seem to dominate the impacts of other channels. Our results
show that, conditional on own income, respondents report lower levels of happiness
when their next door neighbors are richer. On the other hand, median income of
neighbors living in Somerville but not very close to the respondent is positively
related to respondents’ well-being but statistically insignificant. We believe using
such a disaggregated dataset gives a first piece of evidence of the presence of income
comparisons between next door neighbors.
Our multi-scale approach at the county, ZIP code and street-levels support the
idea that the association between well-being and neighbors’ income follows an in-
verted U-shaped pattern in the size of the area. The findings are consistent with
a model where income comparisons, social status and amenities affect agents’ well-
being. At the county-level, the negative impact of social status on well-being domi-
nates the positive effect of public goods whereas it is the opposite at the ZIP code-
level. We also find evidence that residents of Somerville compare to people living in
their street. Next door neighbors share similar public goods and are more likely to
know the consumption of the inhabitants of their neighborhood.
Next section reviews the literature on relative utility and provides a theoretical
framework. Section II details the data at the county and ZIP code-levels. The third
section presents the findings using the BRFSS and administrative data while section
IV uses a survey collected by the city of Somerville. Section V concludes.
I. Utility and Income Comparisons
The effect of neighbors’ income on utility is, a priori, ambiguous since many channels
are at work. In this section, we present different mechanisms which could explain
the relationship between income of neighbors and self-reported well-being. We focus
mainly on (i) income comparisons and social status and (ii) local public goods since
5
we test those explicitly in the next sections.3
(i) Income comparisons: well-being depends partly on individual’s absolute in-
come and partly on individual’s relative income, in the sense that an agent’s well-
being depends on the gap between own income and some reference benchmark.
Getting a new car seems essential when one of our neighbors just bought one (Kuhn
et al. (2011)). We may expect that people are worse-off when agents in their reference
group do better. This refers to a “jealousy” effect. (see Veblen (1899), Duesenberry
(1949) and Stigler (1950)).
Traditionally, this is tested through the coefficient of y∗, the mean or median
reference group income. In our contextual framework, y∗ is the median income of
neighbors. The following relation is assumed:
Ui = U(u1(yi), u2(y
∗), (X)) (1)
where U is the economic concept of utility which depends on y the household
income and y* the place of residence median income. X is a set of individual
covariates.
Our econometric model is as follows:
SWBijt = α + δln(yit) + θln(y
∗
jt) + γXit + εijt (2)
where SWB is the outcome variable (for instance: life satisfaction) for respondent
i in year t living in j and δ is the coefficient associated with household income.4 The
utility function is believed to be concave in household income which explains our
choice to introduce income in logarithmic form. We also rule out the concern that
income spillovers proxy for nonlinearities in the impact of own household income
by using household income dummies instead of computing the “Log of Household
Income” in some specifications. This has no effect on the findings presented in this
3Another economic channel is inflation. Imagine geographical locations with higher income have
more inflation. This effect is partially captured by the introduction of the median value of housing
units in the model.
4There is by now a substantial empirical literature regarding such relative utility effect (Card
et al. (2012); Clark and Oswald (1996); Easterlin (1995); Frank (1985); Kapteyn et al. (1985);
Robson (1992); VanPraag (1971)).
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paper.
θ is the coefficient of interest in this framework. We compute cell averages in
order to measure y∗. The cells are created using an external data set at the county
and ZIP code-levels.5 We follow the literature by using median income household
since it is less sensitive to outliers than the mean (Clark et al. (2008)).
This specification has been used in previous studies using very large area to
compute the median income. We believe doing such an exercise requires very small
areas since comparison is especially strong with close neighbors. It is also plausible
that other mechanisms not related to comparisons affect utility through the median
income variable. For instance, median income could be an indicator of social class
or future income of young respondents.
We try to disentangle some of these different mechanisms by introducing the
relative position of the respondent in the income distribution of the place of res-
idence. Our prediction is that the relative rank in the local income distribution
affects positively utility.
More specifically, our econometric model is the following:
SWBijt = α + δln(yit) + θln(y
∗
jt) + µfijt + γXit + εijt (3)
with
fijt =
i− 1
n− 1 (4)
where n is the number of individuals in the reference group and i the respondent’s
position.
Appendix D describes how our measure of ranking, fijt, is constructed. Intu-
itively, a ranking measures the position of an individual in a specific group (see
Brown et al. (2008) and Powdthavee (2009)). In our case, we attribute to respon-
dents a relative rank in the distribution of household income for each county/ZIP
code. This normalized rank is equal to zero for the poorest household and one for
5Another methodology used in this literature is to compute a predicted income based on in-
dividuals characteristics such as place of residence, age, race or gender. See Clark et al. (2008),
DiTella and MacCulloch (2006) and Frey and Stutzer (2002) for an aperc¸u of the relevant papers
in this literature.
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the richest household in the county/ZIP code.
Including the relative position in the income distribution is interesting for many
reasons. First, it allows us to verify if agents care about how many individuals in
their region of residence are relatively richer or if they care about how much they
are relatively richer. In other words, utility may depend on the importance of the
relative position in society or on the income gap between you and your neighbors.
Second, median income and rank should both capture relative income. Once we
introduce the rank in the local income distribution, it is likely that the median
income will show the impact of other channels such as public goods.
(ii) Local Public Goods: we will test explicitly the public good interpretation by
including many amenities and county-level characteristics in our model. Wealthy
neighborhoods have usually better schools and nicer parks. It may be the case
that we want to have rich neighbors, not because they are rich per se, but because
they pay more taxes and provide better amenities. This may also work through
criminality and unemployment. If neighbors’ income is positively related to utility,
then controlling for public goods should decrease the size of the coefficient of interest
(y∗). On the other hand, if there is a negative relationship between utility and
median household income, then taking into account public goods should make the
coefficient more negative. Recall that in the US, many public goods are provided by
the states and counties (education, health care, roads...). The complete list of local
area variables used in this study may be found in Appendix B and C.
We test explicitly the public goods, social status and income comparisons chan-
nels in the next sections using data from the BRFSS (counties and ZIP codes) and
Somerville’s survey (streets). We will analyze theories of relative utility using dif-
ferent geographical areas and test whether the income comparison process is scale
sensitive. Furthermore, we test the presence of nonlinearities and heterogeneity. It
may be the case that poorer and younger individuals are affected by income of their
neighbors, while richer and older individuals are not.
(iii) Other channels: many other channels may also affect the association between
neighbors’ income and well-being. Median income contains potentially information
about own social status, but also future prospects. Younger agents may thus compare
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more than older agents. This could indicate that there is a“tunnel”effect. Hirschman
and Rothschild (1973) put forward the idea that societies experiencing economic
development may show, at the beginning of the process, more tolerance towards
inequality. The relative increase of others’ income is seen as promising evidence
about the individual’s own chance of success. This first step is then followed, if beliefs
are not met, by a decrease in tolerance of inequality (see Grosfeld and Senik (2010)
for empirical evidence in Poland). Another important element is social distance. We
tend to care more about individuals close to us and less about those in a faraway
city. This could mean that income of close neighbors would affect us in a different
way than income of faraway neighbors. Residents of your city (ZIP code) have a
similar social status or at least one closer than individuals in your county. There
is thus a stronger identification to those neighbors which could be interpreted as a
signal of social class.
We are aware that the association between well-being and neighbors’ income may
be spurious due to omitted socioeconomic and local variables. We include individual
covariates in our models and will verify whether including housing prices and a broad
set of local area characteristics affect our estimates. Next sections will review the
complete lists of variables included in our specifications.
II. Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System
A. BRFSS: County
This paper is based on data from different surveys. We first rely on the Behavioral
Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) which was established in 1984 by the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) but did not include a question
on life satisfaction before 2005 (Brodeur (2012); Goudie et al. (2011); Helliwell and
Huang (2011); Oswald and Wu (2010)). The time period covered with this data
set is thus 2005-2010. The BRFSS is repeated cross section, has a total sample of
around 1,750,000 and contains information on county of residence, household income
and life satisfaction. It covers more than two thirds of the counties in the US: county
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codes are suppressed for counties with fewer than 10,000 residents for confidentiality
reasons and statistical reliability.6
The following question is asked over the period 2005-2010 in the BRFSS: “In
general, how satisfied are you with your life?” where respondents have 4 choices
(4=very satisfied, 3=satisfied, 2=dissatisfied and 1=very dissatisfied). Table 1
presents means and standard deviations of the variables coming from the BRFSS
and shows the distribution of life satisfaction. 45% of the respondents reported
that they were very satisfied with their life. On the other hand, 1% answered that
they were very dissatisfied. The question on household income is the following: “Is
your annual household income from all sources” where respondents have 8 different
choices going from “Less than 10,000” to “75,000 or more”. Respectively 4,8% and
32,1% of the individuals report having less than $10,000 and more than $75,000. We
divide/multiply bottom/top-coded categories by a factor in order to have an income
distribution closer to real figures. We use different factors throughout this paper in
order to test the robustness of our results (see Appendix A for more details).
We match the county of residence of respondents in the BRFSS to county-level
variables. There are on average 62 counties per state. The states with respectively
the smallest and highest number of counties are Delaware (3) and Texas (254). The
median land area of counties is on average 622 square miles for the US. County-level
data used in this paper come from the U.S. Census Bureau, USA Counties, website.7
USA Counties collects thousands of data items from a variety of sources such as the
Bureau of Economic Analysis, the Department of Education, the Federal Bureau
of Investigation and from the 2010 Census of Population and Housing. Appendix
B gives a definition of the county-level variables used in the analysis coming from
this source: unemployment rate, number of violent crimes known by police, local
government direct general expenditures per capita...
Our main variable coming from this data set is the county median household
income over the period 2005-2009. Since there is no information on median household
income in 2010, the last year available (2009) is used as a replacement. Using the
6States have different rules for the data files. It seems though that states report county/ZIP
code-level data when the number of respondents is greater than fifty in a given geographic location.
7http://censtats.census.gov/usa/usa.shtml.
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2010 wave has no effect on the findings reported in this paper. Additionally, USA
Counties gives the percentage of people of all ages in poverty, the percentage of
related children age 5 to 17 in families in poverty and the percentage of people
under age 18 in poverty.
B. BRFSS: ZIP Codes
We also rely on ZIP code of residence. Since the public use version does not identify
the ZIP code of residence, we obtained this information from the BRFSS state
coordinators. We managed to cumulate the ZIP codes for respondents of 8 states:
Arizona, Maine, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Utah and Wyoming.8
Fortunately, there is at least one state per region (Northeast, Midwest, South and
West). The period covered is 2005-2010 for all these states except Texas (2007-2010).
There are 33,120 five-digit ZCTAs and 3,033 county-equivalent in the US as of 2010.
Summary statistics for the 8 states are presented in Appendix Table 1.
We follow the recommendation of BRFSS coordinators and restrict the sample
to ZIP codes where the number of respondents is greater than 50 for statistical
reliability. We combine all the years when doing such an exercise which increases
the number of ZIP codes that we may use. This gives us a sample size of 221,110
respondents. This technique gives us respectively 167, 212, 345, 59, 156, 269, 128
and 81 ZIP codes for Arizona, Maine, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas,
Utah and Wyoming. We also, for some specifications, restrict the sample to ZIP
codes having more than 50 respondents for a given year which gives us a sample size
of 119,141. Last, we obtain the ZIP code median household income for 1999 and
2011 from the U.S. Census Bureau. Estimates throughout rely on the 2011 values,
but our main results are strikingly similar with data from the 2000 Census.
8The remaining states were excluded for three reasons. First, some states did not answer our
request. The second reason is simply that many states refused to provide the data in order to
protect the confidentiality of respondents. Lastly, we did not have the funding to pay for the fees
asked by few states.
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III. County and ZIP Code
A. County-level
This section analyzes the relationship between utility of respondents and income
of their reference group. As mentioned before, utility is measured by self-reported
well-being and the reference group is composed of individuals living in the same
geographical area.9 We first use counties of residence as our unit of social compar-
isons and then extend our analysis to local data. We exploit the large sample of
the BRFSS and match the county of residence with the variables of USA Coun-
ties. Our methodology has the advantage of combining a rich survey and reliable
administrative data.
Table 2 presents our estimates using county-level data. Our econometrics model
is similar to equation (2) presented previously. Life satisfaction is the outcome
variable for individual i in county j in year t and state and year fixed effects are
included. Our variable of interest is median household income. We rely on Ordered
Probit throughout this paper but obtain similar findings with OLS (available upon
request). The first column shows the relationship between median household income
at the county-level and respondents’ well-being without controlling for socioeconomic
characteristics. As expected, the log of own household income is positive and sta-
tistically significant at the 1 % level. The coefficient of our variable of interest “Log
of Median Real Household Income at the County-Level” is negative and statistically
significant which means that conditional on own income, respondents report lower
levels of satisfaction when their neighbors are richer. This is consistent with pre-
vious findings reported by Luttmer (2005). Let’s also note that the coefficient of
our variable of interest is much smaller than the coefficient of “Log of Real House-
hold Income” indicating that own income is more important than relative income.
The estimates imply that if both own household income and neighbors’ household
9Knight et al. (2009) note that two thirds of respondents in a survey of Chinese households
report that their main comparison group consists of individual in their own village. On the other
hand, Clark and Senik (2010) find that the large majority of Europeans compare to their work
colleagues and also to their friends.
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incomes rise by the same percentage, a person would be more satisfied.10
Column 2 adds individual covariates to this basic model. We include the fol-
lowing variables: age, age-squared, gender, 8 dummies of working status (employed,
unemployed for less than a year, ...), 5 education dummies, 6 dummies of marital
status, 4 child dummies and 7 race dummies. While we do not display the coeffi-
cients for these variables, they attract signs that are consistent with those of the
literature. For instance, there is a positive relationship between life satisfaction and
being employed, married or white. Including these controls decreases the size of the
coefficients of interest which mean that socioeconomic characteristics are correlated
with own income and neighbors’ income. Let’s note that the regressions include
different proxies of income such as marital status, education-level and employment
status. It is likely that respondents’ socioeconomic variables are correlated to local
area characteristics. Better-educated individuals tend to live together for instance.
Column 3 verifies the robustness of these findings by replacing the “Log of Real
Household Income” by the “Log of Real Household Income per Equivalent” (see
Appendix A for the computation and a description of this variable). Marital status
and the number of children are not included in this column. Arguably, this income
measure is closer to the individual consumption level. Using this variable or simply
household income has very little effect on median household income. Given that
both income variables yield similar findings, we will use the latter for the remainder
of this research.
Previous results would suggest a priori that individuals report lower levels of
satisfaction when their neighbors are richer. This remark could be challenged by
the fact that our previous work appealed to counties which combine more than one
cities. Another issue is that agents living in large cities identify themselves to their
neighborhood. Columns 4 to 7 verify if the association between satisfaction and
median income depends on the size of the local area which is considered in the
analysis.
10We also find similar findings when we replace the “Log of Real Median Household Income at
the County-Level” by category dummies (i.e. “Less than $30,000”, “More than $30,000” but Less
than $40,000, ...). Our results suggest that the utility function is decreasing at an increasing rate
in (y∗).
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First, column 4 restricts the sample to counties having a very large land area
(greater than 706 sq mi). In our sample, a bit less than 50% of the respondents live
in those counties. 706 sq mi correspond to a radius of 15 miles. Then, column 5 keeps
only individuals living in counties having a land area greater than 254 sq mi (radius of
9 miles) but smaller than 706 sq mi (43% of the sample). The sixth column restricts
the sample to counties smaller than 254 sq mi but larger than 28.26 sq mi (radius
of 3 miles). Approximately 7% of the respondents live in those counties. In column
7, we present an interaction between land area and our variable of interest “Log of
Median Real Household Income at the County-Level”. We rely on an OLS for this
specification since Ai and Norton (2003) pointed out that interpreting interaction
terms in a nonlinear model is not straightforward. Nonetheless, using an Ordered
Probit yields very similar outcomes. This last specification is our favorite since all
the sample is preserved.
We find a negative relationship between well-being and neighbors’ income when
the scale of analysis is large, but this effect fades away when the size of the area
is small. The coefficient of interest is even positive but not statistically significant
in column 6. Column 7 shows a large and positive association between satisfaction
and land area probably meaning that the quality of life is better in rural areas. The
interaction between land area and county median income is negative and statistically
significant indicating that the negative impact of relative income is higher in large
counties.
In summary, our findings seem to point out that the size of the county is critical
in determining the effect of neighbors’ income on satisfaction. The next subsection
will confirm this intuition by analyzing the association between well-being and ZIP
code median income.
B. ZIP Code-Level
We now turn our attention to a different geographical area, ZIP codes (5-digit).
Arguably, a ZIP code represents a city or a large neighborhood. Hence, this probably
means that residents are more homogeneous than at the county-level. Social distance
may also play a critical role. As mentioned before, agents may care more about
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residents close to them and less about those in a faraway city.
Our econometrics model is now the following:
LSijt = α + νc + ηt + δln(yijt) + θln(y
∗) + γXijt + εijt (5)
where the dependent variable is still life satisfaction for respondent i in year
t living in ZIP code j. County and year fixed effects completely control for any
fixed differences between counties and between years, which means that only within-
county variation is used in the estimation. One caveat of this methodology is that a
single ZIP code may span more than one county. To verify that this is not an issue,
we also present the findings where state dummies are included instead of county
fixed effects. We present robust standard errors clustered at the ZIP code-level.
Table 3 illustrates our findings with ZIP code data. We restrict the sample to ZIP
codes where the number of respondents is greater than 50 for statistical reliability.
We combine all the years when doing such an exercise. Our variable of interest is the
“Log of Median Income at the ZIP Code-Level”. Once again, the first two columns
present the relationship between satisfaction and median income (ZIP code) with and
without demographic characteristics. Strikingly, the association between neighbors’
income and well-being is now positive and statistically significant. In other words,
respondents living in richer ZIP codes report being more satisfied with their life.
This is clearly in contradiction with previous findings in the US literature but in line
with the idea that the size of the area matters. The coefficient of interest is almost
twice as large in column 1 than in column 2 probably indicating that individual
characteristics are correlated with neighborhood characteristics.
The next three columns repeat the exercise of restricting the samples to different
geographical areas. Column 3 keeps ZIP codes having a size between 254 and 28.26
sq mi (50% of the sample). The fourth column restricts the sample to ZIP codes
having a size smaller than 28.26 and larger than 3.14 sq mi (40% of the sample).
Column 5 keeps ZIP codes smaller than 3.14 and larger than 0.94 sq mi (radius of
0.55 miles) which represents only 5% of our sample. Column 6 shows an interaction
between the land area and the “Log of Median Income at the ZIP Code-Level”. The
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findings suggest that the relationship between the median income and satisfaction
is nonlinear. The positive effect is larger in column 4 than in columns 3 and 5 and
the estimated association is statistically significant only in the fourth column. On
the other hand, the interaction in column 6 is positive and insignificant.
We believe the size of the reference group (i.e. ZIP codes or counties) is central
for understanding income spillovers since it helps us to disentangle two of the main
channels. Our interpretation is that the positive impact of public goods on well-
being dominates the negative effect of social status at the ZIP code-level whereas it
is the opposite at the county-level. We will verify empirically this theory in the next
sub-sections by including the relative rank in the income distribution and public
goods in our model.
Table 4 presents the effect of neighbors’ income but using the two median incomes
(ZIP code and county) simultaneously. Column 1 first replicates the second column
of Table 3 for comparison purposes. In column 2, the association between neighbors’
income and satisfaction is positive for close neighbors (ZIP code) and negative at the
county-level. This is consistent with our previous results. Agents enjoy living in a
rich city but also having relatively poorer individuals with whom they do not interact
since they have preferences for high social status. Interestingly, the coefficient of the
variable “Log of Median Income at the ZIP Code-Level” is twice as small as the
coefficient of the variable “Log of Median Income at the County-Level”, but both
estimates are statistically significant at the 1% level. This indicates that if both
county and ZIP-code median incomes rise by the same percentage, a person would
be less satisfied. The overall impact of neighbors’ income is thus negative when
considering both median incomes.
We also verify if neighbors’ spillovers have a different effect by age categories. It is
plausible that younger agents are more likely to be affected by income comparisons.
Column 3 shows two interactions between a dummy indicating if the respondent
is younger than 65 years old and the two median incomes. The interactions have
different signs and are both statistically significant. While the sign of the interaction
between being younger than 65 years old and neighbors’ income at the ZIP code-level
is positive, this is the opposite at the county-level. The fact that younger agents are
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more affected by income spillovers may indicate that amenity and social status are
relatively more important for this demographic group.
Finally, the last two columns restrict respectively the sample to respondents
having a household income smaller and larger than the median income at the ZIP
code-level. We find that both groups enjoy living with rich close neighbors but that
the negative association with county median income is larger for poorer respondents.
This is an indication that comparisons affect poorer agents relatively more than
richer agents but that both benefit from public goods.
C. Rank in the Local Income Distribution
Tables 5 upgrades our basic model by introducing the individual household’s nor-
malized rank in the local income distribution (see equations (3) and (4)). Columns
1, 2 and 3 present our estimates at the county-level while columns 4, 5 and 6 do
the analysis at the ZIP code-level. Appendix D gives the details about the con-
struction of this variable. The first column of Table 5 reproduces the finding of the
second column of Table 2 for comparison purposes. Column 2 includes our measure
of social status, the relative rank in the county. Unsurprisingly, the relative rank in
the county of residence is positively related to satisfaction. The coefficient is very
large and statistically significant at the 1% level. But adding the normalized rank
to the model affects dramatically the coefficient on median household income at the
county-level. The coefficient is now positive and statistically significant which means
that, conditional on own income and the relative rank in the county, respondents
report higher levels of life satisfaction when their neighbors are richer. Moreover,
adding the relative rank in the local income distribution in a basic well-being regres-
sion increases more the pseudo-R-squared than including the median income at the
county-level.
This augmented specification complements our previous results. Our interpre-
tation is that once the social status of the respondent is taken into account, richer
faraway neighbors are welcome since they provide better amenities. The effect of
social status is much larger than the impact of public goods at the county-level and
the opposite at the ZIP code-level. Including the relative rank affects also the size
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of the coefficient of own household income. The coefficient is divided by four but
remains statistically significant. This means that the relative rank captures a frac-
tion of the relative income but also of own income. Agents may care about how
many individuals in their reference group are relatively richer and not about by how
much they are richer. Comparisons would thus be local in the income distribution.
Appendix Table 2 verifies our main findings at the county-level by using different
specifications and multiplication factors for the bottom and top income categories.
This seems to have little effect on the coefficients of interest.
Table 5, column 4, looks at the effect of income ranking on life satisfaction within
a ZIP code. The size of the coefficient of median household income at the ZIP code-
level is now larger and remains significant when the rank in the income distribution
is included. The relative rank is positive and statistically significant as it was the
case with county-level specifications. However, the size of the coefficient is sensitive
to sample size (whether we keep only ZIP codes with 50 respondents for a given year)
but also to our treatment of top and bottom-coded categories. Appendix Tables 3
and 4 present the same specifications as in columns 4 and 5 of Table 5, but for
different multiplication factors for top and bottom categories. The relative rank is
positive and statistically significant for 12 out of 16 regressions (not significant when
the bottom category is divided by 1.5 and the top category is multiplied by either 2
and 2.5). Nonetheless, the different coefficients of the relative rank are smaller than
at the county-level. This is another piece of evidence that at the ZIP code-level, the
relative position is far less important than at the county-level.
We then verify whether the rank in the local income distribution matters more at
the bottom/top of the distribution. Columns 3 and 6 of Table 5 replace the variable
“Normalized Rank” by 5 dummies representing classes of ranking in the county and
ZIP code income distribution. We omit the bottom class (having a rank smaller
than 0.20) and thus measure the effect of being in a particular class in comparison
of being in the bottom class. We find nonlinearities in the relationship between
satisfaction and relative ranking. Our results suggest that there is no statistical
difference between respondents in the first two classes at the ZIP code-level and a
small effect at the county-level. On the other hand, moving from the third to the
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fourth class of the county income distribution is predicted to increase life satisfaction
4 times more than moving from the first to the second. This may indicate that being
in the bottom of the local income distribution is very detrimental compared to being
in the top classes but that this negative effect diminishes only when getting to the
middle class. Obviously, any conclusion is tentative since panel data and indication
of social mobility are necessary for this type of analysis.
As a pedagogical device, Figures 1, 2 and 3 illustrate the BRFSS county life
satisfaction distribution using three different specifications. We estimate an OLS
similar to the regression presented in column 4 of Table 2. In this regression, we do
not include the rank and the median household income. We then show the average
life satisfaction for each county (Figure 1). Figure 2 is similar to Figure 1 with
the exception that median household income is included in the specification. Last,
Figure 3 adds to the model the rank and the median household income. These figures
give the opportunity to have a look at the county well-being distribution in the US,
and then to counterfactuals where there would be no income spillover effects.
D. County: Public Goods and Poverty
Since county median income is negatively related to utility, then controlling for pub-
lic goods should decrease the size of the coefficient of y∗ as explained in Section
II. It is also possible that local omitted variables such as values of housing units
explain our findings that neighbors’ income affect well-being. This would mean that
the relationship between well-being and income spillovers is spurious. If this is the
case, then including county-level variables in our model would make the coefficient
of interest insignificant. Table 6 verifies the validity of our previous findings by intro-
ducing county-level variables in the specification (see Appendix B for the definitions
of these variables).
Column 1 introduces the county unemployment rate, the owner-occupied hous-
ing units and the median value of specified owner-occupied housing units to cap-
ture any business cycle effects. It is possible that the intensity of comparisons is
larger/smaller during recessions.11 Moreover, including the median value of speci-
11We do not find any evidence that income comparisons are more important before or after the
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fied owner-occupied housing units and other county-level variables allows us to tackle
the omitted variable bias. The second column includes the percentage of elderly and
the percentage of high school graduate or higher (25 years and older). Poterba
(1997) found that a larger fraction of elderly in a jurisdiction leads to lower public
spending on education. It is also possible that networking with people with higher
education raises well-being. Column 3 adds to the basic model the density of popu-
lation and the urbanization rate since it is possible that social interactions are more
prevalent in small cities. Column 4 includes the number of murders and nonnegligent
manslaughters known to police per capita (using robberies or violent crimes instead
yields similar findings). Column 5 includes all these controls in the model. Columns
6, 7 and 8 includes other types of county-level characteristics which are more likely
to be perceived as public goods: local government direct expenditures on health,
education, welfare, total expenditures and local revenue.
Adding these controls in the model does affect the size of the coefficient of interest
significantly. Agents report lower levels of satisfaction when their neighbors are
richer, but this association is larger when county-level characteristics are included.
Controlling for amenities in the local area decreases the size of the effect of neighbors’
income on agents’ utility (especially when the full set of county-level variables is
included, column 5). This is another piece of evidence that mainly two effects affect
the coefficient of y∗: social status and amenities.
Interestingly, characteristics such as criminality and the economic situation seem
to affect more the variable “Log of Median Real Household Income at the County-
Level”than direct expenditures by the local government. This might be an indication
that agents prefer to live with rich neighbors mainly because it provides a safer
environment and better economic conditions.
Moreover, public goods explain why conditional on own income and the relative
rank, agents report higher levels of utility when their neighbors are richer. Including
the public goods in our model impacts only the coefficient of median income and
Great Recession. We verified this hypothesis by restricting the sample to the period 2005-2007
in one regression and 2008-2010 in another (not shown). The coefficients for the variable “Log of
Median Real Household Income at the County-Level” are quite similar and thus not statistically
different from each other.
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not the coefficient of the relative rank in the income distribution (not shown).
Our findings do not exclude the possibility that agents’ utility is decreasing both
with the prevalence of rich and poor households. This would mean that individuals
are sensitive to poverty and prefer living in counties where they are among the richest
people, but also where poverty is not prevalent. Table 7 looks at the relationship
between satisfaction and different measures of inequality and poverty at the county-
level. Columns 1, 2, and 3 enrich equation (2) by adding respectively the percentage
of people of all ages in poverty, the percentage of related children age 5 to 17 in
families in poverty and the percentage of people under age 18 in poverty in the
county. Conditional on own income and neighborhood median income, individuals
report lower levels of satisfaction as the proportion of poor people increases. Columns
4 and 5 restrict respectively the sample to counties having a Gini coefficient below
and above the median (0.441). The effect of median income is similar for both
columns and not significantly different. Note that the first five columns do not
include any county-level variables.
Columns 6, 7 8, 9 and 10 add to the previous specifications the number of mur-
ders and nonnegligent manslaughters known to police per capita (we also add other
county-level variables in some specifications, available upon request). There is no
more clear evidence that respondents are averse to poverty when we include ameni-
ties. It seems that this aversion to poverty is driven by aversion to criminality and
other factors associated with poverty.
IV. Somerville
A. Somerville Phone Survey
While the previous section analyzed interactions within counties and ZIP codes, this
section looks at a more finely disaggregated level: streets. It may be the case that
jealousy has a stronger effect with people with whom we interact very often such
as street neighbors. In other words, we analyze whether respondents’ well-being is
affected by standard of living of individuals living in the same street.
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This part of our analysis focuses on a survey designed by the City of Somerville’s
SomerStats Office12. Somerville became the first city in the US to collect data
about residents’ self-reported well-being. While this city is very particular and not
representative of the US, we believe using such a disaggregated dataset will give
a first piece of evidence of the presence of income comparisons at the street-level.
Previous empirical papers in this literature have been relying on very large areas as
a reference group and thus probably captured the effects of many other channels.
Somerville is a city in Middlesex County, Massachusetts, located just north of
Boston. As of the 2010 census, the city had a total population of 75,754 and was
the most densely populated municipality in New England with 18,404 people per
square mile. The median income for a household in the city was $61,731 for the
period 2006-2010. The largest industry sectors in terms of employment are health
and social services. Approximately 17% of Somerville residents work within the city
while 50% work in Boston or Cambridge.13
Somerville Phone Survey (“SMP”hereafter) has been conducted during the spring
of 2011 via phone, email and Facebook.14 A total of 393 respondents answered
questions such as “How satisfied are you with your life in general?” and “How happy
do you feel right now?” where respondents have 10 choices. Many respondents
did not answer key questions such as household income, life satisfaction or address
information which leaves us with 323 individuals. Table 1 shows means and standard
deviations of these variables. 14% and 10.8% of the respondents report respectively
that they are very satisfied with their life and very happy. On the other hand, less
than 1% are very dissatisfied or unhappy. The household income question has 16
choices going from less than $20,000 to $300,000 and more. Respectively, 11% and
12The data from this survey are derived from Sensitive Data Files of the City of Somerville,
obtained under special arrangements designed to protect the anonymity of respondents. These
data are not available from the authors. Persons interested in obtaining Data files should contact
the City of Somerville. Contact information is available on our websites.
13See this website for technical reports on the economic situation:
http://www.somervillema.gov/spotlights/comp-plan/trends-meetings-and-reports.
14See Heller (2011) for more details on the SMP. The questionnaire is available on our websites.
Another survey, the Somerville’s Well-Being and Community Survey, has been conducted during
the same period. This survey is a special well-being questionnaire to households as part of the
annual city census. It has a total sample of 6,167 respondents and included questions on household
income and self-reported well-being. Unfortunately, the address of residence is not available which
explains our choice to focus on the SMP.
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1% of the individuals report having less than $20,000 and more than $300,000. We
use multiplication factors as before in order to have an income distribution closer
to real figures. This survey also contains information on gender, age, race, marital
status, years living in Somerville, ward of residence (7 choices), precinct (21 choices),
ZIP code (3 choices)15 and employment status (see Table 1).
The household median income of the respondents in the SMP is $70,000. This is
higher than the the median household income provided in the Census which could
indicate that the survey is not representative. Appendix Table 5 compares the
socioeconomic characteristics of the respondents to those of the 2010 Census and the
Community Survey. There is an under-representation of the poor families and an
over-representation of women and persons 65 years old and over. Readers should thus
keep in mind that the findings of this section have less external validity. Yet, using
such a survey is helpful in understanding income comparisons at a very disaggregated
level.
B. Street-Level Analysis
We estimate social comparisons in the City of Somerville by measuring the distance
between the 323 residents.16 The survey provides information about respondents’
place of residence which allows us to measure the exact distance between the 323
respondents, using longitude and latitude coordinates. We match the address of res-
idence with different measures of public goods. We calculate the distances between
respondents’ residence and different local amenities such as subway stations, parks
and libraries (Heller (2011)). Appendix F describes these variables and provides the
different sources where we obtained the geolocalisation.
Our strategy involves matching a group of neighbors for each citizen. This group
15www.city-data.com/zipmaps/Somerville-Massachusetts.html.
16We also adopt an estimation strategy that enables us to restrict the comparison group to in-
dividuals living in the same ward (not shown for space consideration). Somerville is composed of
7 wards of similar population magnitude which allows us to look at whether individuals report
higher or lower satisfaction levels when their ward neighbors are richer/poorer. In this matching
framework, our standard errors are clustered at the ward-level. The estimated effects of the ref-
erence income (i.e ward median household income) on life satisfaction is negative and significant.
This means that conditional on own income, respondents report lower levels of satisfaction when
their ward neighbors are richer (not shown).
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is composed of residents within a circle of radius r. A first circle of 0.20 miles radius
(0.12 sq mi) is centered around each respondent. This circle contains approximately
10% of the sample. We also construct another circle of 0.40 miles radius, but we
keep only respondents living between the two distances (0.20 and 0.40 mi) in order
to build our second reference group. This ring contains 10% of the sample. Figure
4 illustrates our empirical strategy.
Our econometrics model is:
SWBir = α + δln(yi) + θln(y
∗
r) + γXi + εir (6)
where life satisfaction is the dependent variable for individual i in a given circle
having a radius r, δ is the coefficient associated with household income, X is a
set of individual covariates and θ is the coefficient of interest. We present robust
standard errors clustered at the precinct-level. Individual covariates include age
dummies, gender, 4 dummies of working status (employed, unemployed, student
and out of the labor force), 5 dummies of marital status (married, single, living
as couple, divorced, separated or widowed) and 4 race dummies (White, Asian,
American Indian and African American).
Table 8 presents our basic findings of equation (6). In the first 3 columns, life sat-
isfaction is the dependent variable whereas it is happiness in the last three columns.
Columns 1 and 4 show the relationship between self-reported well-being and median
household income for the first circle only. The coefficient of our variable of interest
“Log of Median Household income (0 to 0.12 sq mi)” is negative in both happiness
and satisfaction regressions but statistically significant solely in the former. This
means that, conditional on own income, respondents report lower levels of happiness
when their street neighbors are richer. The size of the coefficient is larger than at
the county-level and is even bigger than the coefficient of own household income in
the happiness regression.
Columns 2 and 5 upgrade our basic model by including the ring (0.2 to 0.4 mi)
instead of the first circle. Recall that only the income of the respondents between
the distances is included. The coefficient of the second reference group is positive
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but not statistically significant in both regressions. This means that respondents
compare mainly to next door neighbors and less to other citizens of Somerville.
These findings are not sensitive to the use of a multiplication factors for top/bottom
income categories (see Appendix Table 6). Columns 3 and 5 include at the same
time the circle and the ring which yields somewhat similar findings.
We control for distances to the nearest park, public library and subway station
in Table 9.17 We obtained these measures for each survey point from geocoding
data (Heller (2011)). We also include an index of housing price in the regressions.
We use the median price of recent home sales near the place of residence. The data
come from public records publicly available on HomeInsight’s website (see Appendix
F for more details). Residents of Somerville have access to this data easily on
HomeInsight.com and are thus potentially aware of the median price we are using.
The upper panel of Table 9 shows the results using life satisfaction while the
bottom relies on happiness as the dependent variable. Column 1 presents the spec-
ification including the distance to the nearest subway whereas columns 2 and 3
include respectively the distances to the nearest park and library. Last, column 4
includes the three distances to amenities. Median housing prices are included in all
the columns. Overall, controlling for distances to amenities in the local area and
median price of recent sales does not affect our previous conclusion that next door
neighbors’ income is negatively associated to respondents’ happiness.
The findings of Somerville point out the fact that income comparison is present
and affects agents’ utility. We believe income comparison has a stronger effect on
well-being at the street-level than at the county and ZIP code-level since agents
observe directly the consumption of their next door neighbors. Nevertheless, this
survey has a small sample size and is not representative. Any conclusions must
be tentative. We believe this section provided a first step towards identifying the
impact of income comparison on well-being using street-level data.
17Sirgy and Cornwell (2002) argue that satisfaction with physical features affects both neighbor-
hood satisfaction and housing satisfaction. Satisfaction with the social features of the neighborhood
plays a role in the satisfaction with the neighborhood which affects life satisfaction.
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V. Conclusion
This paper analyses the relationship between well-being and neighbors’ income. Our
main findings suggest that the size of the area affects drastically this relationship. In
smaller areas such as ZIP codes, individuals report higher levels of well-being when
their neighbors are rich whereas it is the opposite at the county-level. This is con-
sistent with the idea that agents enjoy living in a rich city but also having relatively
poorer faraway individuals since they have preferences for high social status. We
test explicitly our interpretation by including amenities and the relative rank in the
income distribution in our model.
We also find evidence that residents of Somerville compare to people living in
their street. Hence, the relationship between well-being and income spillovers follows
an inverted U-shaped pattern in the size of the area. Table 10 gives a summary of
our main findings.
While the American literature has concentrated on the psychological role of rel-
ative consumption, we have shown that amenities matter in determining the effect
of neighbors’ income on utility. Obviously, the role of relative consumption is also
important and is very strong for next door neighbors. These results point to some
interesting future research questions. Due to a lack of longitudinal data over a very
long period of time, it was not possible to test whether individuals who experienced
social mobility are more prone to comparisons. It is also of general interest to know
if policies aiming at reducing income inequality are improving general welfare.
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VI. Figures
Figure 1: BRFSS County Life Satisfaction Distribution
Notes: Data came from the BRFSS, 2005-2010. Blank means there were no data for this county. This figure
illustrates the BRFSS county life satisfaction distribution. We estimate an OLS similar to the regression presented
in Table 2 with the exception that we do not include the median household income. We then present the average
life satisfaction for each county.
Figure 2: BRFSS County Life Satisfaction Distribution
Notes: Data came from the BRFSS, 2005-2010. Blank means there were no data for this county. This figure
illustrates the BRFSS county life satisfaction distribution where income spillovers are taken into account. We
estimate an OLS similar to the regression presented in column 2 of Table 2. In this regression, we do include the
median household income. We then present the average life satisfaction for each county.
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Figure 3: BRFSS County Life Satisfaction Distribution
Notes: Data came from the BRFSS, 2005-2010. Blank means there were no data for this county. This figure illustrates
the BRFSS county life satisfaction distribution where income spillovers and ranking in the income distribution are
taken into account. We estimate an OLS similar to the regression presented in column 2 of Table 4. In this regression,
we do include the rank and the median household income. We then present the average life satisfaction for each
county.
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Figure 4: Somerville Phone Survey
Notes: Data came from the City of Somerville (not available from the authors). We distinguish a specific group of
reference for each respondent: neighbors within a circle of radius r. A first circle of 0.20 miles radius is centered
around each respondent. We then construct another circle of 0.40 miles radius, but we keep only respondents living
between the two distances (i.e. ring).
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Figure 5: City of Somerville: Electoral Wards and Precincts
Notes: This Figure illustrates the geolocalisation of the 21 precincts in Somerville. There are
21 precincts in Somerville (3 per ward). Each precinct contains on average 5% of the re-
spondents. This map and many others are available on the City of Somerville’s website:
http://faqs.somervillema.intelligovsoftware.com/wardandprecintmaponline.aspx.
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VII. Tables
Table 1: Summary Statistics.
BRFSS Mean Std. Dev. SMP Mean Std. Dev.
Life Satisfaction Life Satisfaction
[1] Very Dissatisfied 3.389 0.622 [1] Very Dissatisfied 7.687 1.847
[4] Very Satisfied [10] Very Satisfied
Very Satisfied 0.453 0.498 Very Satisfied 0.139 0.346
Very Dissatisfied 0.010 0.101 Very Dissatisfied 0.006 0.078
Happiness
[1] Very Unhappy 7.470 1.835
[10] Very Happy
Very Happy 0.108 0.311
Very Unhappy 0.006 0.078
Household Income Household Income
[0,10 000[ 0.048 0.214 [0,20 000[ 0.111 0.315
[10 000,15 000[ 0.049 0.215 [20 000,40 000[ 0.158 0.365
[15 000,20 000[ 0.068 0.252 [40 000,60 000[ 0.130 0.336
[20 000,25 000[ 0.085 0.278 [60 000,80 000[ 0.158 0.365
[25 000,35 000[ 0.111 0.315 [80 000,100 000[ 0.130 0.336
[35 000,50 000[ 0.148 0.355 [100 000,120 000[ 0.102 0.303
[50 000,75 000[ 0.171 0.376 [120 000,140 000[ 0.062 0.241
75 and more 0.321 0.467 [140 000,160 000[ 0.037 0.189
Male 0.498 0.500 [160 000,180 000[ 0.031 0.173
Age 45.99 16.861 [180 000,200 000[ 0.018 0.135
Elementary School 0.035 0.184 [200 000,220 000[ 0.018 0.035
Att. High School 0.064 0.245 [220 000,240 000[ 0.006 0.078
Grad. High School 0.270 0.444 [240 000,260 000[ 0.009 0.096
Att. College 0.268 0.443 [260 000,280 000[ 0.006 0.078
Grad. College 0.364 0.481 [280 000,300 000[ 0.009 0.096
Married 0.618 0.486 300 000 and more 0.012 0.087
Divorced 0.091 0.288 Female 0.582 0.493
Single 0.292 0.379 Couple 0.114 0.318
Separated 0.174 0.142 Married 0.452 0.498
Widowed 0.056 0.231 Divorced or Separated 0.108 0.311
Couple 0.040 0.196 Widowed 0.068 0.252
No Child 0.557 0.497 Employed 0.614 0.487
One Child 0.173 0.379 Unemployed 0.061 0.241
Two Children 0.167 0.373 Out of Labor Force 0.226 0.418
Three Children or more 0.103 0.304 Student 0.040 0.196
Employed 0.541 0.498 White 0.818 0.386
Unemployed (Less 1Y) 0.036 0.186 African American 0.034 0.181
Unemployed (More 1Y) 0.024 0.154 Asian/Pacific Islander 0.018 0.135
Self-Employment 0.088 0.283 American Indian 0.003 0.055
Retired 0.149 0.356
Disabled 0.048 0.213
Student 0.041 0.197
Full-Time Homemaker 0.074 0.261
White 0.772 0.419
Black or African American 0.106 0.308
Asian 0.034 0.180
Pacific Islander (Hawaiian) 0.004 0.065
American Indian or Alaska 0.015 0.123
Other Race 0.041 0.199
Multiracial 0.020 0.141
Observations 1,737,499 Observations 323
Note: For the BRFSS, sample means are weighted using the final weight associated to each respondent. The period
covered is 2005-2010. For the SMP, we do not report means when respondents refused to answer.
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Table 2: Life Satisfaction and Income Spillovers at the County-Level, BRFSS.
Life Satisfaction Ordered Ordered Ordered Ordered Ordered Ordered OLS
Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
All All All .>706 706>.>254 254>.>28.26 All
Ln (Real HH Income) 0.367 0.236 0.221 0.268 0.214 0.122
(0.009) (0.007) (0.010) (0.004) (0.015) (0.004)
Ln (Real Equiv. 0.231
HH Income) (0.007)
Ln (Median -0.046 -0.067 -0.060 -0.103 -0.083 0.052 -0.026
County HH Income) (0.018) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.039) (0.008)
Land Area County 0.095
(103 sqm) (0.038)
Ln (Median County -0.009
HH Income)* Land area (0.003)
Control Variables
Socioeconomic Controls X X X X X X
State Dummies X X X X X X X
Year Dummies X X X X X X X
Observations 1,737,499 1,737,499 1,737,499 855,957 744,329 131,288 1,737,499
Pseudo R2 0.0380 0.0641 0.0535 0.0638 0.0686 0.0610 0.1142
Note: All estimates are weighted using the final weight associated to each respondent. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses, clustered by county. The period covered is 2005-2010. In the first column, only state and year dummies
are included. The remaining columns include socioeconomics variables (described in the text). Household income
has 8 categories. The log of the real household income is calculated using the middle point of each category (see
Appendix).
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Table 3: Life Satisfaction and Income Spillovers at the ZIP Code-Level, BRFSS.
Life Satisfaction Ordered Ordered Ordered Ordered Ordered OLS
Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All All 254> .>28.26 28.26>.>3.14 3.14>.>0.94 All
Ln (Real HH Income) 0.402 0.272 0.268 0.285 0.240 0.137
(0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.039) (0.002)
Ln (Median 0.121 0.062 0.037 0.078 0.048 0.026
ZIP Code HH Income) (0.015) (0.012) (0.031) (0.019) (0.066) (0.007)
Land Area ZIP Code -0.087
(102 sqm) (0.112)
Ln (Median ZIP Code 0.009
HH Income)* Land area (0.010)
Control Variables
Socioeconomic Controls X X X X X
County Dummies X X X X X X
Year Dummies X X X X X X
Observations 221,110 221,110 103,154 79,731 4,735 221,110
Pseudo R2 0.0475 0.0735 0.0736 0.0775 0.0824 0.1302
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by ZIP Code. The period covered is 2005-2010 (except
for Texas (2007-2010)). In the first column, only county and year dummies are included. In the remaining colums,
state and year dummies are included in the model in addition to socioeconomics variables (described in the text).
Household income has 8 categories. The log of the real household income is calculated using the middle point of
each category (see Appendix)
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Table 4: Life Satisfaction and Income Spillovers by Socioeconomic Characteristics,
BRFSS.
Life Satisfaction Ordered Ordered Ordered Ordered
Probit Probit OLS Probit Probit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All All Age Poorer Richer
Ln (Real HH 0.272 0.271 0.135 0.202 0.345
Income) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.008) (0.012)
Ln (Median 0.062 0.051 -0.005 0.063 0.062
ZIP Code HH Income) (0.015) (0.016) (0.009) (0.018) (0.023)
Ln (Median -0.110 -0.015 -0.144 -0.086
County HH Income) (0.022) (0.016) (0.027) (0.031)
Ln (Median 0.039
ZIP Code HH Income)*Age<65 (0.012)
Ln (Median -0.057
County HH Income) *Age<65 (0.019)
Age<65 0.099
(0.160)
Control Variables
Socioeconomic Controls X X X X X
County Dummies X
State Dummies X X X X
Year Dummies X X X X X
Observations 221,110 219,144 219,144 105,190 113,952
Pseudo R2 0.0735 0.0721 0.1277 0.0570 0.0393
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by ZIP code. The period covered is 2005-2010 (except
for Texas (2007-2010)). State and year dummies are included in the model in addition to socioeconomics variables
(described in the text). Household income has 8 categories. The log of the real household income is calculated
using the middle point of each category (see Appendix). The last two columns restrict respectively the sample to
respondents having a household income smaller and larger than the median income at the ZIP code-level.
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Table 5: Life Satisfaction, Income Spillovers and Rank, BRFSS.
Life Satisfaction Ordered Ordered Ordered Ordered Ordered Ordered
Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All All All All All Alll
Ln (Real HH Income) 0.236 0.064 0.146 0.272 0.231 0.239
(0.007) (0.014) (0.010) (0.005) (0.010) (0.009)
Ln (Median -0.067 0.156 0.073
County HH Income) (0.015) (0.022) (0.018)
Ln (Median 0.062 0.103 0.099
ZIP Code HH Income) (0.015) (0.023) (0.021)
Relative Rank in County (Col. 2) 0.627 0.143
ZIP Code (Col. 5) (0.036) (0.032)
Relative Rank:
Less than 0.20 Omitted Omitted
[0.20, 0.40[ 0.025 -0.002
(0.008) (0.009)
[0.40, 0.60[ 0.102 0.038
(0.011) (0.013)
[0.60, 0.80[ 0.217 0.075
(0.014) (0.017)
More than 0.80 0.280 0.090
(0.021) (0.021)
Control Variables
Socioeconomic Controls X X X X X X
State Dummies X X X
County Dummies X X X
Year Dummies X X X X X X
Observations 1,737,499 1,737,499 1,737,499 221,110 221,110 221,110
Pseudo R2 0.0641 0.0650 0.0650 0.0735 0.0736 0.0736
Note: For columns 1, 2 and 3, estimates are weighted using the final weight associated to each respondent. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by county. The period covered is 2005-2010. State and year dummies
are included in the model in addition to socioeconomics variables (described in the text). Household income has 8
categories. The log of the real household income is calculated using the middle point of each category (see Appendix).
For columns 4, 5 and 6, robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by ZIP Code. The period covered is
2005-2010 (except for Texas (2007-2010)). County and year dummies are included in the model in addition to
socioeconomics variables (described in the text). Household income has 8 categories. The log of the real household
income is calculated using the middle point of each category (see Appendix).
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Table 8: Relationship Between Life Satisfaction and Income Spillovers, SMP.
Ordered Probit Life Life Life Happiness Happiness Happiness
Satisfaction Satisfaction Satisfaction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln (HH Income) 0.212 0.169 0.208 0.180 0.117 0.176
(0.102) (0.102) (0.104) (0.130) (0.118) (0.130)
Ln (Median HH -0.197 -0.207 -0.302 -0.314
Income 0-0.20 mi) (0.144) (0.136) (0.147) (0.144)
ln (Median HH 0.244 0.257 0.282 0.301
Income 0.20-0.40 mi) (0.240) (0.239) (0.289) (0.289)
Control Variables
Socioeconomic Controls X X X X X X
Observations 323 323 323 323 323 323
Pseudo R2 0.0396 0.0395 0.0409 0.0326 0.0312 0.0343
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by precinct. All the columns include socioeconomics
variables (described in the text). Household income has 16 categories. The log of household income is calculated
using the middle point of each category (see Appendix).
Table 9: Relationship Between Life Satisfaction and Income Spillovers, SMP.
Ordered Ordered Ordered Ordered
Probit Probit Probit Probit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Life satisfaction
Ln (HH Income) 0.221 0.237 0.203 0.238
(0.097) (0.106) (0.100) (0.106)
Ln (Median HH -0.171 -0.148 -0.184 -0.171
Income 0-0.20 mi) (0.166) (0.159) (0.174) (0.159)
Happiness
Ln (HH Income) 0.184 0.192 0.168 0.177
(0.126) (0.131) (0.131) (0.136)
Ln (Median HH -0.294 -0.283 -0.315 -0.311
Income 0-0.20 mi) (0.173) (0.175) (0.168) (0.164)
Control Variables
Socioeconomic Controls X X X X
Housing Price X X X X
Distance - Subway X X
Distance - Park X X
Distance - Library X X
Observations 323 323 323 323
Pseudo R2 (satisfaction) 0.0421 0.0446 0.0441 0.0493
Pseudo R2 (happiness) 0.0331 0.0338 0.0382 0.0386
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by precinct. All the columns include socioeconomics
variables (described in the text). Household income has 16 categories. The log of household income is calculated
using the middle point of each category (see Appendix).
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Table 10: Summary.
County ZIP Code Street
yi + + + + + + +
y* - + - + + - -
fi + +
Control Variables
Public Goods X X
State Dummies X X X
County Dummies X X
Year Dummies X X X X X
Socioeconomic Controls X X X X X X X
Cluster County County County ZIP Code ZIP Code Precinct Precinct
Note: See Tables 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 for a description of county-level regressions. See Tables 3, 4 and 5 for a description
of ZIP code-level regressions. See Tables 8 and 9 for a description of Street-level regressions.
VIII. Appendix
A. Creation of the variable ln(household income)
Household income of respondents is available in categories. The number of cate-
gories is respectively 16 and 8 for the SMP and BRFSS. Our strategy for computing
the “Log of Household Income” is the following. We give the middle point of the
household income category to the respondents. For instance, if a respondent an-
swered between $50,000 and $60,000, then $55,000 is his household income. Top
and bottom-coded categories receive a special treatment. All top-coded income are
replaced by 1.5 the value of the topcode. We verify that this has no effect on our
findings by using also 1, 2 and 2.5 (Appendix Tables). For the bottom-coded in-
come category, the value was divided by 2. Once again, this does not affect the
main estimates of this paper. For the BRFSS, the median household income at
the county-level and the household income of respondents are in 2005 dollars. We
also used in some specifications (when it is mentioned) the household income per
equivalent. This measure proposed by the OECD takes into account the number of
individuals in the household. We limit the number of other adults and kids to three.
Household income per equivalent is a quartic in log real family income = 1 + 0.5
(other adults) + 0.3 kids.
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B. List of variables coming from U.S. Census and USA
Counties
When there was no information for some years, the last year available is used as a
replacement. For instance, the number of violent crimes known to police in 2008 is
used for the years 2009-10.
• County Median Household Income (2005-09) U.S. Census Bureau (e.g. IPE010209D)
Household income is total money income received in a calendar year by all
household members 15 years and over. Total money income is the sum of
amounts reported separately for income from wages or salaries; nonfarm self-
employment; farm self-employment; social security; public assistance; and all
other regularly received income such as veterans’ payments, pensions, un-
employment compensation, and alimony. Receipts not counted as income
include various “lump-sum” payments such as capital gains or inheritances.
The total represents the amount of income received before deductions for per-
sonal income taxes, etc (see Source Notes and Explanations - Appendix A
at http://www.census.gov/support/USACdata.html). See Appendix A.C for
details on the real median household income for ZIP codes.
• Gini Coefficient, U.S. Census Bureau
• High School Graduate or Higher, 25 years old and over - percent (2005-09)
U.S. Census Bureau (EDU635209D)
• Local government finances - general revenue per capita (FY 2002) U.S. Census
Bureau (LOG015202D)
• Local government finances - direct general expenditures per capita (FY 2002)
U.S. Census Bureau (LOG315202D)
• Local government finances - direct general expenditures for education per
capita (FY 2002) U.S. Census Bureau (LOG320202D)
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• Local government finances - direct general expenditures for public welfare per
capita (FY 2002) U.S. Census Bureau (LOG330202D)
• Local government finances - direct general expenditures for hospitals and
health per capita (FY 2002) U.S. Census Bureau (LOG340202D)
• Median value of specified owner-occupied housing units (sample in 2000) U.S.
Census Bureau (HSG495200D)
• Number of Murders and Nonnegligent Manslaughters Known to Police (2005-
2008) U.S. Census Bureau (e.g. CRM140208D)
• Number of Robberies Known to Police (2005-2008) U.S. Census Bureau (e.g.
CRM160208D)
• Number of Violent Crimes Known to Police (2005-2008) U.S. Census Bureau
(e.g. CRM110208D)
• Owner-Occupied Housing Units (in 2000) U.S. Census Bureau (HSG440200D)
• People of all ages in poverty - percent (2005-2009) U.S. Census Bureau (e.g.
IPE120209D)
• People under age 18 in poverty - percent (2005-2009) U.S. Census Bureau (e.g.
IPE220209D)
• Population per Square Mile (2010) U.S. Census Bureau (POP060210D)
• Related children age 5 to 17 in families in poverty - percent (2005-2009) U.S.
Census Bureau (e.g. IPE320209D)
• Resident population 65 years and over, percent (2005-2009) U.S. Census Bu-
reau (e.g. AGE775209D)
• Size of the area, Square Mile U.S. Census Bureau
• Unemployment Rate (county for the BRFSS) Bureau of Labor Statistics (as
of 2011/11/08)
• Urban Population (in 2000) U.S. Census Bureau (POP110200D)
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C. ZIP Code
• ZIP Code Median Household Income (1999) U.S. Census Bureau
• ZIP Code Median Household Income (2011) U.S. Census Bureau
The maximum value for the ZIP code median household income in 2011 is
$250,000. We use different multiplication factors in this paper. When not
specified, we multiply $250,000 by 1.5. We verify that this has no effect on our
findings by using also the following factors: 1, 2 and 2.5.
• Size of ZCTAs (2010), Square Meter, GIS: projection is North America Albers
Equal Area Conic
The U.S. Census Bureau does not report statistics at the ZIP code-level (five-
digit) since the land area covered is not always well identified. Instead, the 2000
Census and 2010 Census report statistics for ZIP Code Tabulation Areas (ZCTAs).
ZCTAs are: “generalized area representations of U.S. Postal Services (USPS) ZIP
code service areas. They represent the most frequently occurring five-digit ZIP code
found in a given area” (www.census.gov/geo/ZCTA.html). In most cases, the ZCTA
code is the same as the ZIP code for an area. The 2010 Census identifies 33,120
five-digit ZCTAs. We thus rely on the ZCTAs and obtain the median household
income at the ZCTA code-level from the Census. This measure is not available yet
for 2009 which means that we have to rely on the 1999 median household income.
D. Ranking
“Rank” measures the second moment of the income distribution and determines the
relative position in the local income distribution. This variable is created using
the variable household income and by computing the number of households for a
specific reference group (i.e. by county and year in the BRFSS). The household’s
normalized rank in the income distribution is defined as the rank in the county /
number of households in the county. This normalized rank is equal to zero for the
poorest household and one for the richest household. Remember that household
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income is available only in categories which explains that more than one household
may have the same ranking. This explains why the richest households do, most of
the times, have a value near one. The only case in which one household has a rank
of one is that only one household is in the top-coded income category.
E. Weights
For all our equations in this paper using county-level data, the personal sampling
weights is used to have representatives sample (at the state-level). As a specification
check, we also re-scaled the weights from each cycle to sum up to one for each
year since the sample size of the BRFSS increased dramatically between the waves
2006-2007. This methodology had no effect on our main estimates (available upon
request). See Pfeffermann (1993) and Angrist and Pischke (2009) for a discussion
on the role of sampling weights.
F. Somerville
We match the address of residence with different measures of public goods. See
Heller (2011) for more details.
• Subway station addresses (www.mbta.com)
• Somerville parks, City of Somerville (Census 2009)
• Public library addresses (www.somervillepubliclibrary.org/contactus.html)
• median price of recent home sales (http://www.homeinsight.com/home-value/ma/somerville.asp)
as of December 1st, 2012
HomeInsight gives a market Snapshop of recent home sales near the place of
residence. We calculate the median using the sale price of the seven closest
home sales.
47
IX. Appendix Tables
Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics: ZIP Codes, BRFSS.
State No. of No. of Avg. Pop. Avg. Cty No. of No. of Avg. Pop. Avg. ZIP
Cty Cty Per Cty Area (sqm) ZIP ZIP Per ZIP Area (sqm)
(Sample) (Sample) (Sample) (Sample) (Sample) (Sample)
Arizona 15 15 1305 7888 364 167 117 72.5
Maine 16 16 1659 1566 399 212 125 61.8
Ohio 88 87 424 459 1160 345 107 37.4
Rhode 5 5 4745 321 70 59 402 15.8
Island
South 66 66 638 1402 381 156 188 136.8
Dakota
Texas 254 107 231 1258 1866 269 92 48.7
Utah 29 25 1261 1770 278 128 246 69.2
Wyoming 23 23 1223 4830 169 81 347 45.2
Note: Only states for which we have the ZIP codes are included in this table. Columns one and two show respectively
the number of counties per state and the number of counties for which data is available (our sample). Columns 3 and
4 present the average population per county and the average county area for the counties in our sample. Columns
5 to 8 do the same as columns 1-4 but using the ZIP codes instead.
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Table A.2: Life Satisfaction and Income Spillovers at the County-Level, BRFSS.
Panel A:
Bottom-Coded
Income Category
Divided by 2
Top Top Top Top Top Top Top Top
Ordered Probit Multi. Multi. Multi. Multi. Multi. Multi. Multi. Multi.
by 1 by 1.5 by 2 by 2.5 by 1 by 1.5 by 2 by 2.5
Ln (Real HH Income) 0.243 0.236 0.219 0.204 -0.016 0.064 0.105 0.115
(0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.013) (0.014) (0.011) (0.009)
Ln (Median -0.042 -0.067 -0.076 -0.081 0.244 0.156 0.092 0.063
County HH Income) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.019) (0.022) (0.020) (0.019)
Relative Rank 0.860 0.627 0.462 0.393
in County (0.028) (0.036) (0.033) (0.029)
Panel B:
Bottom-Coded
Income Category
Divided by 1.5
Top Top Top Top Top Top Top Top
Ordered Probit Multi. Multi. Multi. Multi. Multi. Multi. Multi. Multi.
by 1 by 1.5 by 2 by 2.5 by 1 by 1.5 by 2 by 2.5
Ln (Real HH Income) 0.297 0.256 0.233 0.214 -0.006 0.105 0.145 0.144
(0.009) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.016) (0.016) (0.012) (0.009)
Ln (Median -0.049 -0.073 -0.082 -0.085 0.235 0.112 0.043 0.025
County HH Income) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.021) (0.023) (0.020) (0.018)
Relative Rank 0.836 0.512 0.339 0.297
in County (0.033) (0.041) (0.035) (0.030)
Control Variables
Socioeconomic Controls X X X X X X X X
State Dummies X X X X X X X X
Year Dummies X X X X X X X X
Note: All estimates are weighted using the final weight associated to each respondent. Robust standard errors are
in parentheses, clustered by county. The period covered is 2005-2010. State and year dummies are included in
addition to socioeconomic variables (described in the text). Household income has 8 categories. The log of the
real household income is calculated using the middle point of each category (see Appendix). The log of the median
household income come from the U.S. Census Bureau, USA Counties. Observations: 1,737,499.
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Table A.3: Life Satisfaction and Income Spillovers at the ZIP Code-Level, BRFSS.
At Least 50 Respondents per ZIP Code
Panel A:
Bottom-Coded
Income Category
Divided by 2
Top Top Top Top Top Top Top Top
Ordered Probit Multi. Multi. Multi. Multi. Multi. Multi. Multi. Multi.
by 1 by 1.5 by 2 by 2.5 by 1 by 1.5 by 2 by 2.5
Ln (Real HH Income) 0.278 0.272 0.252 0.234 0.162 0.231 0.235 0.220
(0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.012) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008)
Ln (Median 0.078 0.062 0.057 0.055 0.182 0.103 0.076 0.072
ZIP Code HH Income) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.031) (0.024) (0.021) (0.020)
Relative Rank 0.377 0.143 0.066 0.058
in ZIP Code (0.033) (0.032) (0.030) (0.029)
Panel B:
Bottom-Coded
Income Category
Divided by 1.5
Top Top Top Top Top Top Top Top
Ordered Probit Multi. Multi. Multi. Multi. Multi. Multi. Multi. Multi.
by 1 by 1.5 by 2 by 2.5 by 1 by 1.5 by 2 by 2.5
Ln (Real HH Income) 0.309 0.295 0.268 0.246 0.207 0.282 0.272 0.245
(0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.013) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008)
Ln (Median 0.074 0.058 0.054 0.053 0.158 0.070 0.050 0.054
ZIP Code HH Income) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.029) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019)
Relative Rank 0.302 0.040 -0.013 0.003
in ZIP Code (0.034) (0.031) (0.029) (0.028)
Control Variables
Socioeconomic Controls X X X X X X X X
County Dummies X X X X X X X X
Year Dummies X X X X X X X X
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by ZIP Code. The period covered is 2005-2010 (except
for Texas (2007-2010)). County and year dummies are included in addition to socioeconomic variables (described in
the text). Household income has 8 categories. The log of the real household income is calculated using the middle
point of each category (see Appendix). The log of the median household income come from the U.S. Census Bureau,
USA Counties. Observations: 221,110.
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Table A.4: Life Satisfaction and Income Spillovers at the ZIP Code-Level, BRFSS.
At Least 50 Respondents per ZIP Code per Year
Panel A:
Bottom-Coded
Income Category
Divided by 2
Top Top Top Top Top Top Top Top
Ordered Probit Multi. Multi. Multi. Multi. Multi. Multi. Multi. Multi.
by 1 by 1.5 by 2 by 2.5 by 1 by 1.5 by 2 by 2.5
Ln (Real HH Income) 0.277 0.270 0.250 0.231 0.084 0.181 0.206 0.198
(0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.015) (0.016) (0.014) (0.013)
Ln (Median 0.103 0.081 0.074 0.072 0.310 0.190 0.133 0.121
ZIP Code HH Income) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029)
Relative Rank 0.613 0.304 0.164 0.137
in ZIP Code (0.044) (0.054) (0.054) (0.052)
Panel B:
Bottom-Coded
Income Category
Divided by 1.5
Top Top Top Top Top Top Top Top
Ordered Probit Multi. Multi. Multi. Multi. Multi. Multi. Multi. Multi.
by 1 by 1.5 by 2 by 2.5 by 1 by 1.5 by 2 by 2.5
Ln (Real HH Income) 0.307 0.270 0.265 0.243 0.119 0.181 0.257 0.231
(0.009) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015) (0.013)
Ln (Median 0.098 0.081 0.070 0.069 0.284 0.190 0.080 0.085
ZIP Code HH Income) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029)
Relative Rank 0.542 0.305 0.028 0.045
in ZIP Code (0.048) (0.058) (0.055) (0.052)
Control Variables
Socioeconomic Controls X X X X X X X X
County Dummies X X X X X X X X
Year Dummies X X X X X X X X
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by ZIP Code. The period covered is 2005-2010 (except
for Texas (2007-2010)). County and year dummies are included in addition to socioeconomic variables (described in
the text). Household income has 8 categories. The log of the real household income is calculated using the middle
point of each category (see Appendix). The log of the median household income come from the U.S. Census Bureau,
USA Counties. Observations: 119,141.
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Table A.5: Somerville: 2010 Census and Sample.
Census and Community Survey Sample from the SMP
Median Household Income [2006-2010] 61,731 Median Household Income [2011] 70,000
Household Income
[0,10 000[ 7.4%
[10 000,15 000[ 5.0%
[15 000,25 000[ 8.3%
[25 000,35 000[ 7.7%
[35 000,50 000[ 13.5%
[50 000,75 000[ 17.2%
[50 000,75 000[ 14.8%
[50 000,75 000[ 16.1%
[50 000,75 000[ 5.8%
200,000 and more 4.1%
Household Income
[0,20 000[ 11.1%
[20 000,40 000[ 15.8%
[40 000,60 000[ 13.0%
[60 000,80 000[ 15.8%
[80 000,100 000[ 13.0%
[100 000,120 000[ 10.2%
[120 000,140 000[ 6.2%
[140 000,160 000[ 3.7%
[160 000,180 000[ 3.1%
[180 000,200 000[ 1.8%
[200 000,220 000[ 1.8%
[220 000,240 000[ 0.6%
[240 000,260 000[ 0.9%
[260 000,280 000[ 0.6%
[280 000,300 000[ 0.9%
300,000 and more 1.2%
Female 50.9% Female 58.2%
Persons 65 years and over 10.4% Persons 65 years and over 17,5%
White 73.9% White 81.8%
Black 6.8% African American 3.4%
Asian 8.7% Asian 1.8%
American Indian 0.3% American Indian 0.3%
Employed 70.9% Employed 61.4%
Unemployed 4.8% Unemployed 6.1%
Observations Observations 323
Note: See Table 1 for more descriptive statistics of the SMP.
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